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Abstract
The purpose of thls paper is to present to current
and future users a description of the safety approval
process established by the Natlonal Aeronautics and 5pace
Administration (NA5A) for Get Away Special (CA5)
payloads. Although the designing organization is
ultimately responsible for the safe operation of its
payload, the Get Away 5pecial team at Goddard 5pace Flight
Center will act as advlsors whlle iterative safety
analyses are performed and the 5afety Data Package inputs
are submitted. This four phase communications process
will ultimately glve NA5A confidence that the GA5 payload
is safe, and successful completion of the Phase III
package and revlew w111 clear the way for flight aboard
the 5pace Transportation 5ystem (5T5) orbiter.
Introduction
All Get Away 5peclal (GAS) payloads and canister
hardware whlch are to be considered for space fllght on
the 5pace Transportation System (5T5) must meet certaln
deslgn criterla prlor to fllght and ground safety
approval. The Goddard 5pace F11ght Center (G5FC) 5pecial
Payloads Divislon ls responsible for ensurlng that each
GAS payload assembly and lts associated ground support
equipment (G5E) ls safe and complles with the requirements
of NHB 1700.7, Safety Pollcy and Requirements for Payloads
Uslng the 5T5, and 5T5 Payload Ground 5afety Handbook, KHB
1700.7.
5afety approval is typically divided into four steps,
designated as Phases O, I, II and III, whlch are
reiterated as payload design ls deflned and gradually
finalized, and as potential hazards associated wlth that
deslgn are identified. For most standard GA5 payloads,
the 5T5 5afety Review Boards at the 3ohnson 5pace Center
(35C) and the Kennedy 5pace Center (K5C) become involved
in the safety approval process only at the Phase III level
of review; Goddard 5pace Fllght Center ls responsible for
the intermediate O,I and II levels of payload approval.
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The results 0£ each GSFC internal review and all
hazard verification controls are incorporated into a flnal
document, the Phase III Safety Data Package (SDP), and a
Phase III safety revlew ls conducted jolntly wlth the
Johnson Space Center for flight operations, and with the
Kennedy Space Center for ground operations. For approval
o£ more complicated payloads, JSC and KSC may participate
much earller in the process and would approve the payload
at each level of review.
Payload Accomodatlons Requirements
The Payload Organization (PO) submits the £1rst
safety data as part o£ the Payload Accomodatlons
Requirements (PAR) document. Thls occurs approximately
twelve to fourteen months before launch, and corresponds
to a Phase 0 level revlew. The purpose of the PAR ls to
identify major payload subsystems and to assess the
applicability of a payload withln the GAS program
requirements and limitations.
Included in the PAR are a description of the payload
hardware conceptual deslgn, proposed operational
requirements, and any safety related conditions or
possible areas of concern. It is not important that all
pertinent information be available at Phase 0, simply that
a cursory look has been glven and w111 be updated as other
safety concerns become apparent throughout the process.
Thls information ls reviewed by GAS fllght and ground
operations personnel, GA5 and JSC safety engineers, and
the NASA Technical Manager (NTM), who ls the single polnt
o£ contact between GSFC and the PO. All comments from
these participants are incorporated and finalized as a
baseline PAR.
Phase I (Preliminary Deslgn)
The Phase I iteration of the safety review process,
submitted as a Preliminary Safety Data Package, Drovides
more information on the safety critical components and
operations o£ the GAS payload. A more detalled devlce
description, hardware sketches and other preliminary
illustrations should be included as part of thls
document. Potential payload-related hazards and proposed
safey controls and lnhlbits should be discussed, and a
hazard control verification plan developed For evaluation.
Hazard reports For each identified hazard should also be
9ubmltted wlth the Preliminary 5afety Data Package.
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Hazards are categorized as either critical or
catastrophic, a critical hazard ls defined as anythlng
that could cause unintentional damage to the orblter,
proximity payloads or the GA5 container ltself. Crltlcal
hazards must be controlled to one fallure tolerance,
meanlng the payload must remaln safe even after one
credlble component fallure. Those hazards whlch could
result in personnel lnjury, loss of the orblter, or
destruction of 5T5 and other equipment are considered
catastrophic, and must be shown to be two fallure
tolerant. The data provlded by the PO must substantiate
the above when addressing each potential hazard.
The Preliminary 5afety Data Package ls distributed to
members of the GA5 team for independent revlew, a joint
revlew ls then held wlth the NA5A Technical Manager and
GAS safety and operations personnel to dlscuss questions
or areas of concern regarding the information provided.
Pertinent GSFC technical experts are also available for
consultation if necessary. The Payload 5afety Offlcer
(PL50) incorporates all comments from thls revlew lnto one
marked-up verslon of the safety package, whlch ls sent to
the Payload Manager along wlth a letter of clarification
of those comments.
5everal weeks after the 5DP ls returned to the
Payload Organization, a telephone conference is scheduled
by the NTM and Payload Manager to discuss any questions
the PO may have concerning the G5FC Phase I review. Thls
discussion ls typically focused on the incorporation of
additional information in preparation of the Final Safety
Data Package required for Phase II of the revlew process.
Phase ZZ (Final Deslgn)
At Phase ZZ, fairly detalled hardware illustrations,
system or subsystem block diagrams, and detalled
schematics showlng the necessary hazard controls are
required. As payload deslgn proceeds, more detail ls
needed on hazards that could affect STS f11ght and ground
operations and crew. Payload descriptions must begin to
lnclude speclflc information about payload subsystems,
potential hazards and proposed controls, and methods of
verifying hazard controls.
During thls period, the payload organization must
begln to submit a reviewable summary of each hazard
verification method. Thls information would lnclude, for
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example, structural and other analyses, a parts and
materials list of all payload components, and results of
such things as vibration testing, leak and proof pressure
testing of sealed containers, and functional testing of
fuses, temperature and low voltage cutoffs, and other
battery or circuitry malfunction controls. These
summaries are reviewed, independent of the payload
organization, to ensure that the data contained therein is
complete and accurate, and successfully meets the
requirements for controlling hazardous functions or
subsystems. Copies are kept on file with GAS safety
engineers for future reference if necessary.
As before, GAS safety engineers independently review
the system inputs, recommend changes or additions to the
identified hazards, and review and approve the safety
verification of these hazards. The PL50 incorporates thls
data lnto a marked-up copy of the Flnal 5afety Data
Package whlch ls agaln sent to the Payload Manager via the
NTM. Another telephone conference ls scheduled to clarify
any questions about the Phase II revlew and discuss
additional information needed to prepare the Phase III
Safety Data Package, including completed hazard reports,
for submittal to the 35C and K5C Safety Review Boards.
G5FC Phase III
The Phase III 5afety Data Package is the final
submittal of safety information. It states that adequate
analysis and testlng of the GA5 payload has been performed
and identifies all hazards that could be associated wlth
the operation or malfunction of the payload or payload
component. The Phase III package must include a detalled
discussion of appropriate safety measures whlch have been
implemented to effectively eliminate or control these
hazards.
Each hazard report ls considered a stand-alone
document at the Phase IIZ level. All credible fallure
modes of a payload must be identified by this polnt, and
the hazard potential of each speciflc failure must be
assessed. Hazard controls and methods o£ verifying that
those controls are in place and operational are
established to ensure that all unsafe conditions are
inhibited to an acceptable level of safety rlsk, i.e. one
or two fallure tolerant. Verification methods may lnclude
tests, analyses or inspection, and similarity to other
payload designs may sometimes be used if approved by the
GAS and 5T5 Safety Review Boards.
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The status of each verification method must be
tracked as payload design proceeds. An item is considered
to be "open" until a test or analysis is complete and the
results have been submitted and approved by G5FC. In
general, all verification methods must have a "closed"
status before Phase III safety approval will be given.
Along with a "closed" status, supportive data for each
method of hazard control verification must be included for
future reference or auditing. This data would include,
but is not limited to, test and analysis report numbers,
inspection procedure numbers, quality control log book
references, drawing numbers and completion dates.
In some cases, the Phase III 5afety Data Package may
be submitted to the 5T5 with "open" status items. For
example, procedures whlch are to be performed as part of
£1nal payload preparation at K5C would remain "open" until
payload close-out. However, a copy o£ the procedure must
be on flle with GAS personnel, and reference to the
specific procedure number as part o£ the hazard report is
required.
5T5 Phase III
Upon G5FC Phase III approval, the Phase III Safety
Data Package is submitted by the GA5 project to both the
K5C and J5C for review. Included with this submittal are
a signed Certificate of 5T5 Payload 5afety Compliance
signed by the CA5 Project Manager, and a letter of
approval from the G5FC Materials Control and Applications
Branch for all parts and materials used on the payload.
KSC reviews are focused on potentially hazardous
ground payload processing operations such as battery top-
off charging and hoisting, and the use o£ other ground
support equipment and tools brought to K5C by the payload
organization. The 35C safety board reviews payload flight
operations for compatibility with manned-flight
requirements and regulations, and ultimately determines
that a payload is safe for flight aboard the 5T5 orblter.
These reviews are typically handled administratively
between NA5A centers, however in some cases a formal
review may be required. I£ so, the appropriate CA5 safety
personnel would meet with 5T5 safety personnel to clarify
any outstanding issues and generate an acceptable,
approved Phase III Safety Data Package.
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As part of updated post-Challenger documentation
requirements, those GAS payloads whlch had previously been
approved through 5T5 Phase III prior to 3anuary 1988 are
now required to submlt a Delta Phase III Safety Data
Package. The purpose of this additional step in the
aproval process ls to ensure the 5T5 safety boards that
the payload has been reevaluated and remalns in compliance
with NASA safety standards and regulations. Prior to 5T5
resubmlttal, new signatures o£ approval are requlred from
the GAS Project Manager, GAS 5afety Englneer and the GSFC
Materials Control and Applications Branch for reexamined
parts and materials usage.
Post Approval
Receipt of 5T5 flight and ground safety approval is
the final step in the revlew process. The GAS payload is
then appropriately inserted lnto the CA5 manifesting queue
to awalt a fllght opportunity. Once manifested, the
Payload Organization dell vers the payload to KSC, where
flnal preflight inspection ls performed by the GSFC. In
some cases, a verification or demonstration of the hazard
controls referenced in the safety documentation may be
requested. This inspection verlfles that the payload ls
exactly as described in the safety information previously
provided, and ls indeed safe for 5T5 flight.
Conclusion
The four phase safety review and verification process
established for small, self-contained payloads, and
specifically Get Away 5peclal payloads, is an important
process which ultimately glves NASA confidence that a CA5
payload assembly is safe and ls in compliance with 5T5
safety regulations as deflned in NHB 1700.7 and KHB
1700.7. The requirements set forth by NASA in those
documents are lntended to protect fllght and ground
personnel, the 5T5, other payloads and associated ground
support equipment and the environment from payload-related
hazards.
The information provided in the Safety Data Packages
should become more speciflc and complete with each
successive step in the approval process. For each phase
of review, the Get Away Special team at Goddard Space
Fllght Center wlll act as advisors whlle lterative safety
analyses are performed and these Safety Data Package
inputs are submitted. Several iterations help to ensure
that all potential hazards associated wlth a GA5 payload
have either been eliminated by deslgn, or are controlled
to an acceptable level of rlsk.
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By establlshln9 regular safety communications early
in the system development, the payload organization w111
benefit from GSFC and STS safety en91neerln9 experience,
and therefore possibly avold costly or tlme consumin9
des19 n errors; cooperation throughout thls communications
effort w111 result in a GAS payload des19 n whlch ls
considered safe and f119ht ready. Upon successful
completion of the Phase III Safety Data Package and
review, the GAS payload w111 be appropriately lnserted
into the GAS manifesting queue, and w111 ultimately be
awarded a flight opportunity aboard the 5T5 orblter.
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